Far East Cynic

Mr. Will votes no.

Not that anyone will listen to  him-but from a purely American interests standpoint-he may be right:

U.S. forces are being increased by 21,000 to 68,000, bringing the coalition total to 110,000. About 9,000 are from Britain, where support for the war is waning. Counterinsurgency theory concerning the time and the ratio of forces required to protect the population indicates that, nationwide, Afghanistan would need hundreds of thousands of coalition troops, perhaps for a decade or more. That is inconceivable.

So, instead, forces should be substantially reduced to serve a comprehensively revised policy: America should do only what can be done from offshore, using intelligence, drones, cruise missiles, airstrikes and small, potent special forces units, concentrating on the porous 1,500-mile border with Pakistan, a nation that actually matters.

Genius, said de Gaulle, recalling Bismarck’s decision to halt German forces short of Paris in 1870, sometimes consists of knowing when to stop. Genius is not required to recognize that in Afghanistan, when means now, before more American valor, such as Allen’s, is squandered.

Sadly though, given the political pressures at home-and the perceived pressure not to look like a wimp that will come from those who are quite willing to pay for Paul’s war while robbing Peter’s cookie jar-we are not going anywhere anytime soon.

Exactly who won the Afghan election anyway?

  1. Who has ever won in Afghanistan? Short of the Afghans, that is.

    I have said for some time now that we need to kill everyone there who needs killing and then leave. That country (or region) sucked in the Brits for over 100 years and the Russkies for even longer (the Germans for a short period, too). What do they have to show for their forays over the last couple of centuries? Nothing.

  2. The Mongols “won” In Afghanistan. Though in doing so they laid waste to a significant portion of the country.
    The Russkies “lost” because they had p^ss poor troops, trained to fight a different kind of war..Full of conscripts. poor leadership, drunks and drug users it wasn’t an army as much as a mob with Hind gunships.
    Yeah, Will’s comments echoes those of Porter Stewart and both MAY be right. Its certainly true we cannot maintain this current level of men and material for very long.
    The new strategy is to secure the larger cities and train more Afghans to do the heavy lifting, ie the fighting and dying.