Ralph Peters and I agree on something:
USA Today
February 24, 2009
Pg. 11
The Mendacity Of Hope
The U.S. essentially has four options – from best to worst – going forward
in Afghanistan.
By Ralph Peters
The conflict in Afghanistan is the wrong war in the wrong place at the wrong
time. Instead of concentrating on the critical mission of keeping Islamist
terrorists on the defensive, we’ve mired ourselves by attempting to
modernize a society that doesn’t want to be – and cannot be – transformed.
In the absence of a strategy, we’re doubling our troop commitment, hoping to
repeat the success we achieved in the profoundly different environment of
Iraq. Unable to describe our ultimate goals with any clarity, we’re
substituting means for ends.
Expending blood and treasure blindly in Afghanistan, we do our best to shut
our eyes to the worsening crisis next door in Pakistan, a radicalizing
Muslim state with more than five times the population and a nuclear arsenal.
We’ve turned the hose on the doghouse while letting the mansion burn.
Initially, Afghanistan wasn’t a war of choice. We had to dislodge and
decimate al-Qaeda, while punishing the Taliban and strengthening friendlier
forces in the country. Our great mistake was to stay on in an attempt to
build a modernized rule-of-law state in a feudal realm with no common
identity.
We needed to smash our enemies and leave. Had it proved necessary, we could
have returned later for another punitive mission. Instead, we fell into the
great American fallacy of believing ourselves responsible for helping those
who’ve harmed us. This practice was already fodder for mockery 50 years ago,
when the novella and film The Mouse That Roared postulated that the best way
for a poor country to get rich was to declare war on America then surrender.
Even if we achieved the impossible dream of creating a functioning, unified
state in Afghanistan, it would have little effect on the layered crises in
the Muslim world. Backward and isolated, Afghanistan is sui generis (only
example of its kind). Political polarization in the U.S. precludes an honest
assessment, but Iraq’s the prize from which positive change might flow,
while Afghanistan could never inspire neighbors who despise its
backwardness.
Recalling failures of Vietnam
Echoing Vietnam, we’re pouring wealth into Afghanistan, corrupting those we
wish to rally; we’re fighting with restrictions against an enemy who enjoys
sanctuaries across international borders; and our core enemies are natives,
not foreign parties (as al-Qaeda was in Iraq).
If the impending surge fails to pacify the country, will we send another
increment of troops, then another, as we did in Southeast Asia? As the
British learned the hard way, Afghanistan can be disciplined, but it can’t
be profitably occupied or liberalized. It’s inconceivable to us, but many
Afghans prefer their lives to the lives we envision for them. The lot of
women is hideous, and the lives of nearly all the people are nasty, brutish
and short. But the culture is theirs.
Even “our man in Kabul,” President Hamid Karzai, put his self-interest above
any greater cause. Reborn a populist, he backs every Taliban claim that the
U.S. inflicts only civilian casualties in virtually every effort against
terrorists. Karzai is convinced that we can’t abandon him.
We should do just that. Instead of floundering in search of a strategy, we
should consider removing the bulk, if not all, of our forces. The
alternative is to hope blindly, waste more lives and resources, and, in the
worst case, see our vulnerable supply route through Pakistan cut, forcing
upon our troops the most ignominious retreat since Korea in 1950 (a massive
air evacuation this time around, leaving a wealth of military gear).
Ranked from best to worst, here are our four basic options going forward:
Best. Instead of increasing the U.S. military “footprint,” reduce our forces
and those of NATO by two-thirds, maintaining a “mother ship” at Bagram Air
Base and a few satellite bases from which special operations troops,
aircraft and drones, and lean conventional forces would strike terrorists
and support Afghan factions with whom we share common enemies. All resupply
for our military could be done by air, if necessary.
Stop pretending Afghanistan’s a real state. Freeze development efforts.
Ignore the opium. Kill the fanatics.
Good. Leave entirely. Strike terrorist targets from over the horizon and
launch punitive raids when necessary. Instead of facing another Vietnam
ourselves, let Afghanistan become a Vietnam for Iran and Pakistan. Rebuild
our military at home, renewing our strategic capabilities.
Poor. Continue to muddle through as is, accepting that achieving any
meaningful change in Afghanistan is a generational commitment. Surge troops
for specific missions, but not permanently.
Worst. Augment our forces endlessly and increase aid in the absence of a
strategy. Lie to ourselves that good things might just happen. Let U.S.
troops and Afghans continue to die for empty rhetoric, while Pakistan decays
into a vast terrorist refuge.
A reality check
In any event, Pakistan, not Afghanistan, will determine the future of
Islamist extremism in the region. And Pakistan is nearly lost to us – a fact
we must accept. Our strategic future lies with India.
President Obama pitched Afghanistan as the good war during his campaign,
while rejecting our efforts in Iraq as a sideshow. He got it exactly wrong.
Now our new president either needs to lay out a coherent, detailed strategy
with realistic goals, or accept that, by mid-2002, we had achieved all that
conventional forces could manage in Afghanistan.
We don’t need hope. We need the audacity of realism.
Ralph Peters is a retired Army officer, a member of USA TODAY’s board of
contributors and the author of Looking For Trouble: Adventures in a Broken
World.
The only thing I really disagree with here are two things:
1) Iraq is no one’s prize-least of all ours. All we have done is trade one Arab government for another, and given them an American trained Army with which to overthrow it.
2) India is not our ally about anything. They are out to screw us at any opportunity and only care about advancing themselves-at the expense of about 350,000,000 of their own citizens. If they had such an abiding alliance with us-they would have let us base aircraft out of their country. And they would not be building a blue water Navy while their people still have horrific poverty.
I’ve never been a big India fan. That stems from the fact that I still think their head of state should be a British Monarch and British Viceroy, and also because I’ve not been overly impressed with the two Indian cities I have visited. They ranked only a step above Alexandria in terms of “hell hole”ness.
However, Peters is right about the fact that by making the deals we did, to keep our ground presence light in 2002-making some deals with petty warlords-we kind of helped lay the ground work for the corruption that is now widespread in Karzai’s government.
Plus the recently concluded “cease fire” in the SWAT in Pakistan, does not exactly bode well for the future.