From Galrahn:
The third biggest issue is the apparent ass kicking someone in NAVAIR needs for completely forgetting to include Rotary Wing aircraft in the Navy’s 30 year aviation plan. On one hand we have the QDR stressing the importance of Rotary Wing, and on the other hand we have this quote from page 7 of the 30 year aviation plan:
The majority of modern platforms have the ability to perform across many traditional mission sets (e.g. the surveillance and strike capability of the MQ-9 and the cargo and aerial refueling capability of the KC-130). The multirole nature of our assets makes them highly adaptive, fostering significant mission flexibility for the joint force. For the purposes of this report, the aviation plan groups aircraft into seven categories according to their primary mission: fighter/attack; unmanned multirole surveillance and strike; ISR/command and control (C2); intratheater lift; strategic lift; aerial refueling tankers; and bombers. Rotary wing, tilt-rotor, and trainer aircraft are not included.
This is the kind of overwhelming stupidity one finds when Fighter Jocks are the only aviators who make Flag officer.( Skippy comment: That’s not 100% true-besides female STRATCOM community officers, Helo and E-2 folks have made flag-only they never get to direct aviation policy. They run the the shore establishment) Helicopters matter to the Navy at least as much as other aviation, and in just about every aviation capability from the sea short of land attack – they matter most to the fleet. Rotary Wing aircraft are not only the most important aviation capability in HA/DR, but make up the only organic aviation capabilities in a strike group today that can provide ASW from the air. Are we not adding Romeos and Sierras into strike groups having previously recognized that we had not originally planned enough Rotary Wing capability? Remember what I said about littoral warfare? Rotary Wing is littoral warfare to the Navy, and is the most important aviation asset in small wars. Afghanistan proves this.
We are deploying ships with hangers to fight piracy without helicopters, USS Bainbridge (DDG 96) being a perfect example, because we want them to have ScanEagles. In the meantime the amphibious ships don’t have the ScanEagles they need for the Marines at sea, and when the Navy looks at aviation with a 30 year plan they forget to include helicopters?
It reminded me of something that annoyed me a bit while I was at West. I think it was Rear Admiral William J. Holland who asked a question of the panel on Thursday afternoon asking the panel “If you were required to cut something from the force to save $2 billion, what would it be?” Bob Works answer was legacy ISR – which to me says P-3s. We have already retired the S-3s, so why not?
The US Navy may have a fighter gap, but they have a serious strategic planning gap in the aviation community when priorities like the P-3 and Rotary Wing are considered back of the bus capabilities of the Navy. Leadership in Navy Aviation is too busy trying to be the Air Force instead of emphasizing missions and capabilities that are core Navy missions. This is a troubling trend that suggests a complete lack of clarity towards ones primary mission; the kind of trouble that I strongly believe is worth cutting an aircraft carrier or two to fix if necessary.