Waking up and smelling the coffee….

In Japan, that is.

Earlier this week, Phibian went high order because the new leadership in Japan had threatened to cancel Japan’s support of re-fueling ships in the Indian Ocean in support of the war on (Terror, The Taliban, Islamic Extremists, Fill in the blank). As I noted to him then-most of that rhetoric is for domestic consumption-the alliance with Japan is solid. Unlike our douchebagging teabagging minority over here-the Japanese actually have a much better sense of the center-regardless of who is in power.

There are plenty of reasons to believe that fears of a DPJ reassessment of Japanese foreign and security policy — and relations with the U.S. — were exaggerated. First, Northeast Asia is a scary place. Japanese anxieties have been rising for over a decade and with good reason: the country is surrounded by hostile or potentially hostile neighbors. In this environment, no government is going to undermine the cornerstone of its security system and its foreign policy for the past half century, especially when the alliance has served it so well.

Second, there will be an Upper House election next year. If the DPJ is to stand any chance of consolidating its grip on power, it needs to make sure voters will have no easy reasons to vote against it. That means taking the security issue off the table, hence the signs of "new realism" in DPJ thinking even before the election, with revisions of the party platform that soften objections to the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and the base realignment plan. Third, what is the alternative? Improved relations with Asia is the mantra; striking a better balance between East and West the goal. That is laudable, but how can Tokyo improve relations with Beijing?

That key relationship has been on the upswing since Koizumi left office and his successors have stayed away from Yasukuni Shrine to avoid offending Chinese (and Korean) sensitivities.

Hatoyama understands-far better than many American observers give him credit for, that its all about the economy stupid.  He’ll find himself in good company with the American head of state as both try to undo the damage to their economy George W Bush caused:

The real issue in this election, the one with the most implications for Japan’s future and its relations with the U.S., is economic policy. In important ways, this election signals Japan’s return to its historical social consensus. The DPJ manifesto and Hatoyama’s now infamous New York Times opinion piece that appeared before the ballot reflect traditional Japanese approaches to foreign and domestic policy.

Japan is re-embracing its traditional social compact. Hatoyama’s Times comment has repeated references to "non-economic values" and an emphasis on fairness, social welfare, and the failure of "U.S.-led globalization." (Empahsis mine). This is a rejection of the reform agenda that was pushed by the Koizumi administration. That choice is certainly Japan’s to make — and one that a majority of Japanese would endorse; at least the election suggests as much — but it has profound implications for Japan and its alliance partner.

Its interesting, Japan has debt problems that makes ours look small, but you don’t see a million moron march on Kudanshita. No they are going to give the new government some time:

The preference for equality over efficiency signals a turn away from market forces in Japan’s economy and will result in even slower growth. Add a mountain of debt — at 170 percent of GDP, already the biggest among developed nations, and sure to expand with the DPJ’s election promises — a bleak demographic profile, and an inward-looking trade agenda, and Japan looks set to marginalize itself within Asia, those regional ambitions notwithstanding.

Trade issues deserve more attention, especially if the new government wants to raise its Asian profile. If current DPJ policies or promises are realized, the prospect of subsidies to farmers in a (misguided) attempt to increase food self-sufficiency will aggravate trading partners. Promises to exclude agriculture threaten to derail negotiations with Australia; the decision to exclude rice from an FTA with the U.S. dooms prospects for that deal. Japan’s readiness to increase protection for its farmers may win votes, but it makes bilateral and regional deals tougher, and makes a mockery of the Doha round’s call to focus on the needs of developing countries. Japan is not creating "gold standard" trade agreements, nor will it be broadening relations with Asian partners. It certainly won’t be able to match China’s aggressive trade diplomacy.

America’s debt is only 70% of GDP. So what are they whining about?

The simple truth is that its time to re-look at the alliance, and the US needs to be honest about the fact that it is getting more than it is giving in terms of benefits from having ships and aircraft in Japan.

The alliance must diversify and focus less on military issues and more on security broadly defined, whether this is fighting disease, protecting critical infrastructure, stemming the spread of weapons of mass destruction, creating energy security, or trade security. An aggressive and creative agenda, one that Japan helps define and shape, can better balance the two countries’ contributions to a real partnership. And if Japan can put something of equal or greater value on the table, then the capability that Futenma represents should be up for consideration as well.