I am not a Georgian………….

From either Georgia.

However that statement that was made last month by Sen John McCain was made on August 12, 2008.

“He knows that the thoughts and the prayers and support of the American people are with that brave little nation as they struggle today for their freedom and independence. And he wanted me to say thank you to you, to give you his heartfelt thanks for the support of the American people for this tiny little democracy far away from the United States of America. And I told him that I know I speak for every American when I say to him, ‘ Today, we are all Georgians,’ ” McCain declared.

Um…….no. You are not speaking for me.

Because I would have told Georgia to wake up and smell the coffee -and remember where you live. And because not every little sliver of land gets to be an independent nation. And if they do- I better be willing to back up my talk of joining NATO with some resources.

We don’t encourage Taiwan to be stupid. What makes Georgia different?

Georgia’s Lessons for Taiwan

by Jeffrey Bader and and Douglas Paal

Posted September 2, 2008

The Russian attack on Georgia sent ripples of alarm through Europe and the
United States. Irrespective of arguments over who started the conflict and
who is responsible, the West got the message: Russia expects to dominate the
states of the former Soviet Union, and we can expect years of jockeying for
influence in those states, with attendant tensions.

Americans and Europeans are not the only ones who have been watching with
interest. In Asia-particularly Taiwan-people are wondering what events in
the Caucasus may portend about their own security.

Like Georgia, Taiwan lies on the periphery of a major power, in this case
China, growing in strength in recent years. Russia’s designs for Georgia are
not absolutely clear, but with regard to Taiwan, China is unambiguous in its
assertion of sovereignty and its intention to absorb it in the long-run.

In both cases, the policy of the United States is central to the
calculations of all the players. The United States leads plans to bring
Georgia into NATO. With respect to Taiwan, U.S. security interests are of
much longer standing, and the assumption of a U.S. commitment to defend
Taiwan in case of attack is one of the foundations of security and stability
in Asia. It is no wonder that many Taiwanese watched the events in Georgia
with deep concern about their own future, and what these events say about
the reliability of U.S. defense assurances.

What are the lessons of the Russia-Georgia crisis for Taiwan, and for U.S.
policy toward Taiwan? We would point to six:

1) Be careful about security commitments. They mean something. Don't make

them unless you mean it. NATO is not a feel-good organization designed to

increase the self-esteem of its members. It is a solemn commitment by its

members to treat an attack upon one as an attack upon all. There should be

no consideration of bringing Georgia into NATO unless the United States and

the rest of the European members intend to bring the full force of NATO

power to its defense. We do not believe in fact that the United States or

the Europeans have any such intention. To provide a security commitment to

Georgia and then not back it up is to send a message to all potential

adversaries, including China in the Taiwan Strait, that the United States is

not serious. On the other hand, we need to continue to make clear to China,

including through military planning and deployments, the U.S. security

interest in a peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues and the

unacceptability of a Chinese attack, so that Beijing will not be tempted to

see in the Georgia crisis a model for resolution of its own irredentist

aims.

 

2) Don't provoke the bear, or the dragon, expecting the eagle to fly to the

rescue. Georgia's President Saakashvili has shown a propensity for

statements and actions that seems to say to the United States and Russia,

"Let the two of you fight over me." His goal has seemed to be to encourage

the United States and Russia to see Georgia as the target of a zero-sum

security game and to appeal to the U.S. conscience to back him up. Taiwan's

former president Chen Shui-bian took the same approach to the triangular

relationship among Taiwan, the United States, and China. The result in

Saakashvili's case has been to leave his troops alone to face an angered

Russian military. In Chen's case, it led to heightened cross-Strait

tensions, but in Taiwan's case, the United States showed wisdom and took

issue with Chen and his provocative behavior and withdrew its support.

 

3) A constructive relationship between the United States and major powers is

an essential component of security for vulnerable states. The United States

has enjoyed a positive and constructive relationship with China for most of

the past 36 years. Taiwan's security has greatly benefited from this, as the

PRC has understood that an attack on Taiwan would profoundly damage its

relationship with the United States and its place in the world. On the other

hand, the deterioration of U.S.-Russian relations and a disdainful attitude

toward Russian security interests for the last decade led us to a situation

where Russia seems to see little risk to its interests, and much to gain, in

redefining its relationship with the United States.

 

4) Geography matters. Small nations near large powers should not forget who

their neighbors are. Cuba has not prospered through its 50 years of defiance

of the United States. Taiwan's newly elected President Ma Ying-jeou seems to

understand well that an improved relationship between Taiwan and China is

essential to Taiwan's future security. In the absence of unambiguous

security commitments from the United States, such as those enjoyed by

countries like Japan, small states might best seek a balance?the strongest

possible U.S. commitment to their defense and survival, hedged by a

non-hostile relationship with their big power neighbor. Taiwan's example

shows that prosperity and full-blown democracy can find their way in a

tyrannical shadow.

 

5) It's wise to speak softly when you don't plan to carry a big stick. U.S.

statements and actions implying that we would defend Georgia when we had

neither the will nor the intention to do so, not to mention an adequate

understanding of the region's internal conflicts, sent all the wrong

signals. They encouraged Saakashivili to provoke the Russians and face their

response alone. The Russians saw the U.S. warnings as a bluff. And they sent

a message to our allies, including those in Asia, that our real commitments

might prove as empty as our casual verbal ones.

 

6) Credibility is global. There are no purely local crises. U.S.

commitments, even in the post-Cold War era, remain critical for the

stability of the international system. Potential adversaries and potential

friends alike draw conclusions from our behavior. We want them to understand

we will act to defend friends where we have declared security interests. We

need to be careful about when and where we declare those interests to be

engaged, but once we do we need to act in ways that sends a message to

potential aggressors that reinforces their restraint. 

 

Mr. Bader is director of the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings

Institution. Mr. Paal is vice president for studies at the Carnegie

Endowment for International Peace.