Some things take longer than a comment block to explain. Accordingly-since this is my blog and I will write what I want to- I have decided to address commenter Michael Junge’s comments in a more lengthy fashion. After all, not everything in the world can be reduced to a Power Point slide-or a bulletized point paper.
Lets start with the easiest thing first: numbers. Mr. Junge says that I am wildly off on my numbers. I don’t think so-except perhaps for a concept that should be readily apparent to both of us: latency of track data. The Proceedings list is as of March 1, 2011. It pictures 339 flag officers with lineal numbers going down as far as 398. The difference could simply be lag time in updating the Naval Register, a document I do not have readily available. ( Why does the old joke about seniority among JO’s being like virginity among whores appear in the back of my head now?). Regardless, one conclusion we can both agree on, there are more flag officers than there are warships. (286 vs 364). Why do I use 364? Because I add in the current selects-and its not always one in one out, especially in a world of Goldwater Nichols. The fact that there were 398 lineal numbers tells me that there were more than 339 flags at some point in the last year.
220-221, whatever it takes. Fly what you want-log what you need. 😉 ( The issue at Tailhook is not that we took a few liberties with out female party guests-we did.)
The real point here is that in a below 300 ship Navy there are too many flag officers.That’s my argument-and it is not flawed because there is a difference in lineals vs pictures. That is what I mean by missing the point. 339 is still about 75-90 too many. That’s the issue that needs discussion here-not 339, 364 or 425. I didn’t work in OPNAV for a reason.
So that brings us to the other points which I will address in no particular order:
You ask good questions, but that’s all you do. You don’t support your assertions or questions with any rationale beyond “we have too many”. Why not ask it this way: Why have 4th Fleet in it’s own bastion instead of co located with the Combatant Commander the way other Fleets are? That could reduce the admin support footprint, and make for a true Joint structure for the Fleet and Combatant Command it supports.
If you will refer back to the post, I made it clear I was trying to keep it short. But I’ll address your question. First of all in general, numbered fleets are not located where the COCOMS are because like why you rob banks, that’s not where the ships are. Furthermore-we had a Southern Command for years, and we got along just fine with Second Fleet and an adjunct NAVSOUTH staff that also had other duties. Plus there is no hard and fast rule that a Naval Component Commander has to be a three star-it’s designed to be scalable based on the force. Given the paucity of ships in the SOUTHCOM AOR-a one star could do just as well. I think a cogent argument could be made against Southcom too-but I know that’s a losing proposition. ( Same argument could be made against Africom too-or it could be argued that dual hatting the same fleet commander(e.g. C6F) is the way to go).
Now lets go to something I do know a lot about-aviation logistics to show you why I know I am right about both the TYCOMS and CNIC. “Why do we have lead follow TYCOMS anyway? Why not have just one-and the equivalent of COMFAIR on the opposite coast. 1/3 the manpower required-and a lot of the day to day work can be contracted out”. I remain adamant in my assertion: CNAL, Surflant, Sublant-all of those flag positions can be done away with. Not the staff’s mind you-but the flag billets. Same with CNIC-the Navy doesn’t need a three star running installations, it needs to return them where they were and where they belong-the TYCOMS. Maybe you don’t remember when the TYCOMS had rather large shore station management divisions-I do.
You need to remember the history of how we got here. We had a perfectly good LANT and PAC establishment, with the shore stations under their respective TYCOMS for many years. Then in the late 90’s as we started down the “better business Navy”, the shore stations were transferred to the regions. Who also were in a couple of cases not commanded- as they should have been by 1110’s, 1120’s and 1310’s and 1320’s-but by 1700’s. Folks who had zero approaches to the pier, traps or anything else warfare related. And as a consequence made some pretty boneheaded decisions ( Like not keeping the Fresnel lens up at a certain Naval Station-as a cost saving measure. ( true story)). As a result the TYCOMS started casting about how to get their fingers back into the pie again-and restore what head been badly broken by one flawed decision.
Then along came Uncle Vern, who proceeded to f*ck every thing up royally. The result was “regionalization” on steroids and the Navy was also stricken with “Enterprise fever”. ( A dangerous and debilitating disease if not carefully controlled with proper medication and ass whippings of certain deranged individuals). I know-I had a ringside seat as it happened in Japan. For almost nine years I got to watch the transition and the after effects. They were not good. The Tycoms did what they could, like prying the ASD’s and AIMD’s out of the air stations and placing them under a typewing: my little band of happy warriors, MLC’s, government civilians and contractors.
Eventually-as a result of what can only be described as a witless purge over in Sixth Fleet-the result of an obsession with reducing in theater bodies by a certain flag officer-we ended up running supply pools for C6F, C5F and C7F. With a staff of about 75 and about 800 people in eight commands across eight time zones. The most senior person working for us down range was an O-5. With an O-6 directly reporting to a TYCOM commander. That’s why I know it can be done. Now that I have a had a chance to see the contracting world up close-I would have liked to have had the authority to have some contractors at our overseas locations, but even without we did OK. All it took was money, knowing who to shake down to get more money, and an aggressive plan. ( and this was against the backdrop of a war or two).
Until our friendly P-3 folks came along and f*cked it all up- it worked pretty well.
But here is the thing-it also worked fine when the shore stations worked for the TYCOMS via the respective COMFAIRS. I’ve got the files and point papers still in my records here at home to prove it.
I can drill down as much as you want-but here is the bottom line: The Navy made a foolish reorganization of the shore stations and of our little staff, simply to create another flag billet in Japan. The move was unecessary then and it is unnecessary now.
But that’s where you have to remember the other side of the story-the personalities involved. I’ll forgo the details here-but trust me, its not a good story nor does it reflect well on the individuals who promoted these stupid ideas.
So in that one way alone I can save 3 flag positions right there. I can save you even more by reducing the number of Navy regions from 11 down to six. If we had done the BRAC correctly it probably could be even more-details available on request. I’ve already told how how I would eliminate CNIC-if need be reduce Vitale’s job to a one star embedded in FFC and have O-6’s run the TYCOM shore station offices. With business rules agreed upon by the three TYCOMS and backed up by FFC, I know it will work fine. Naval Aviation already has shown the way on this score in several areas-so I know it can work.
I can go on. There are plenty of ways to tighten up at the flag level-I am not so sure I see the point of going further here, except to say that my ideas are right (by definition) and they can save flag billets. They won’t save money per se-except in pay dollars for flag officers, but the Navy needs to get less penny wise and pound foolish about its TAD dollars anyway.
There is of course a bigger reason to do these things. It was voiced by another commenter, enlisted and junior officers are getting screwed and thown under the bus routinely ( especially in the surface community). Yet they don’t see the pain being shared by individuals with wide gold braid. If bluejackets are getting screwed and downsized, then so should flag officers.
I’ll close with a final explanation here-I feel strongly on these issues because I spent 29 years of my life in the service of an organization I dearly loved-even if I did not always like it. Whether you believe it or not, that organization is veering off the road and into a ditch; or off a cliff. The personnel O-6 and below are like kids strapped into their seats, while the flags get ready to jump for it before the bus goes careening off the cliff. One needs to speak out about that.
In the grand scheme of things, I am just another disgruntled retiree, who happens to know that the Navy of today is not as good as it was or could be again. That’s my core belief and I shall not be shaken in it. By anyone.
Skippy,
The reorganizaton of ASD’s and AIMD’s have drive us maintainers up the godd@mn wall. Can you say AIRSpeed? I knew you could. Can you say no parts for sun downing platforms or platforms that the F.A.G Mafia, who have taken over NavAir, feel are unimportant unless it is a F.A.G airframe.
I knew you could. Due to Naval Aviation Enterprise, we are seeing parts that are vital for older airframes (like say the might Grumman EA-6B) are being disposed of because these parts aren’t being ordered in high numbers. So when all of a sudden we have rash of these parts being needed, they are no where to be found. In turn it becomes a red monkey at the MO meeting, which in turn leads to either a rash order from some new contractor or a road trip to Tuson for a bunch of maintainers to get parts. That isn’t right and actually costing us more money, time and lives cause the parts that we get from Tuson may not be serviceable for long or out right failures. The civilians side of the aviation community has been dealing with resold parts for years and the questions of whether or not some aircraft accidents were due to these “grey” parts being sold or even resold to keep older aircraft reserviceable has been something that has been kicking the FAA’s rear for years.
As to the mass of GOFO, I remember reading something about Jackie Fisher the First Sea Lord right before the First World War. He saw that they had been creating flag billets just to validate some GOFO’s exsistance until they could reach the mandatory retirement age. He found that it lead to no boon in fighting capability of the fleet. In turn he gutted a number of older ships that had been around since Nelson and gutted the GOFO’s so that others who had fighting intivative could rise to the top. He revised the advancement procedures for officers so that the juniors could rise to the top.
Something else that I have noticed studying history is that national militaries that have more GOFO’s then actual war fighters have serious issues when a war comes up. To name a few, the British, Germans, Italians, French, The Americans.
Oh and for those that don’t know: F.A.G = Fighter Attack Guys = Strike Fighter Community.
SAP,
I well understand your frustration-but I would submit the ASD and the AIMD’s are the long end of the whip. The blame starts with some key decisions that were made back at CNAF. I am well familiar with Airspeed-and a lot of things done with Airspeed were not the best we can do.
In particular-was the decision not to maintain inventories overseas. At one time there were Good Idea Faires in CNAF that were proposing eliminating all overseas AIMD’s and relying on FEDEX DHL. It took a lot of convincing to remind them that basic services needed to be on site. The decision to recduce engine producing sites to one or two was indeed a bad one.
Furthermore-in the case of the Prowler, I’ll bet you a beer NAVICP has already made reductions in inventories on the premise of realizing savings up front. And that was done with the blessing of someone in CNAF. Especially since TYPEWINGS have to keep their expenses inside some arbitrary target dollar wise.
Back when I was in my squadron-the focus was on up jets and training readiness. When “Cost wise” readiness became the important thing-the rot began.
Skippy,
I don’t doubt what you say. However, it drives me up the wall to see my CO/XO/DH get thier crank caught in a vice from TYCOM and CAG cause we can’t seem to simple crap like splices specific to an airframe or a certain block of airframes (like your current E-2 bubbas with thier variety of different Hummers in the fleet) need X electric box by can’t use Y. Meanwhile, ASD and AIMD are stocked for Z because of mis-information from either TYCOM or CNAF. Anyhow, this is a debate for another day and probably over more then a few Kirin’s to argue our points while the Geshia girls laugh at our slang and sing us pretty songs.
To the point of GOFO’s and the reorganization of the fleet in an attempt to streamline things. Ponder this, during the opening of WW2 we use to have only CNAF, but due to growth of the Naval Air Arm we broke it up to become CNAP and CNAL. Then as we had forward deployed assests in Japan and Europe we had COMFAIRJAPAN (or something to that affect, my memory is a little hazy on what the actual acroynm looked like) and COMFAIRMED. Those guys were supposed to be the first step in the line to knock around the depot at places like Cubi or Sig if the deployed fleet units weren’t getting the help they were looking for, they were also suppose to help expedite parts from CNAF and CNAL’s warehouses out to the fleet units. What is really interesting is that both of those COMFAIR’s started out as O-6’s and have slowly migrated up to become either O-7’s or O-8’s. That growth has been because someone got into thier mind they needed to be equal with someone else.
SAP:
Also recall though, that the missions for CNAP and CNAL were quite different — CNAP was primarily focused in supporting a far flung theater wide mix of cv-based, float- and to a lesser extent, shore based a/c and among other things, was figuring out ways to rapidly replace a/c losses on the big decks (enter the CVL). CNAL, OTOH, originated out of the battle of the North Atlantic and was ASW focused (recall seeing in the old CNAL bldg when I was there in the late 80’s one of the wall planning harts used for shore-based air ASW patrols from the Gulf up to Newfoundland), so there was a mission-based rationale for two TYCOMs.
w/r, SJS
SJS,
Your right I had forgotten that there was two different mission sets for CNAL and CNAP. CNAL didn’t have to worry that much about supporting carrier air after the tide of the war shifted. Except for a couple of the USS Ranger’s Missions north into the Norwegian Sea and the CVE’s ops as part of the Battle of the Atlantic along with support for Operation Dragoon. The rest of their worry on carrier air was getting the new builds out of New York and Newport News, getting thier air wings trained and through to the Pacific. The other thing was the ASW ops from all the major shipping ports on the American Conteniats over to either Africa, India, Europe, Asia.
While CNAP had to worry about the fleet and building the infrustructure so that the fleet aviation could remain at the front lines longer before having to come home. That is why in a number of places they were able to build up depot facitilies in places like Tarawa, Kwajelin, Espurito Santo, etc. That being said as well they didn’t deserve to be remerged back into one CNAF, CNAF should have remained at the top of the food chain reporting back to NavAirSysCom (or BuAir pick your poision). Simply because CNAF could take the competeing input from groups like COMAEWWINGLANT and COMAEWWINGPAC and look hard at what was going on find a way to adequately define and help decided what was mission critical that needed to be addressed to NavAirSysCom’s budget request for the next FY. Instead we have what? A CNAF CO who is a three star with two 1 stars reporting to him from CNAL and CNAFR. Why not just leave CNAF a two star and have two senior O-6’s as the COMFAIR’s, while having a CNAP and CNAL again as a brand new minted O-7 who is waiting for either a BatGru or some other Staff tour to get cleaned up.
I guess the other thing that confuses me about all these GOFO’s is how many of them seem to do multiple tours on someone’s staff. Just skimming through the fact file’s bio page, they have some guys doing a Joint tour as a seasoned LT and then after a DH tour in a command again, it is back to a staff tour on either another joint billet or in the five-sided wind tunnel, then praying for pick up to screen for PXO which leads to CO and then another staff tour on either a BatGru staff or ashore overseas in a NATO/Allies joint billet, then screen for O-6, then another staff tour on another BatGru or in the five-sided wind tunnel again, then maybe screen for O-7 and after that back on to another staff then maybe to a flag billet of some sort. Meanwhile in the middle of that a NPS tour or a NWC/War College of some sort.
Looking at it all just doesn’t make sense to me, but what I do know I am just a blueshirt.
“In the grand scheme of things, I am just another disgruntled retiree, who happens to know that the Navy of today is not as good as it was or could be again. That’s my core belief and I shall not be shaken in it. By anyone.”
Yep. And it is a belief and opinion you are entitled to. But that doesn’t make it either unassailable, or correct.
Well that’s one opinion-you’ll forgive me if I don’t accept it. And as my old friend Sir Winston said: I may be drunk, but in the morning I‘ll be sober and you‘ll still be
a black shoeugly.What you forget is that I know many of the people who made these decisions-their motives were not pure-nor were their intentions to provide good results. The best people-the ones the Navy really needed- were left by the roadside some time ago.